Mereja Forum

[Economist]

Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology
Vol. 2, No. 3, September, 1971, pp. 209-224.

THE LIFE GAME: SURVIVAL STRATEGIES IN ETHIOPIAN
FOLKTALES

DAVID C. KORTEN

Graduate School of Business Administration Harvard  University


Based on the following Harvard research, you can read Woyane like an open book. Their fundamental values are:

1-Deception --- Woyane are the perfect deception engineers. Woyane feel the are winners when they deceive you. Their goal is to make sure they
win by deception. They will say "WE LOVE the Eritrean people.". Based on this Harvard research, they are actually saying they
want to make you SOFT and beat you down. They will say we are "BROTHERS" .... "ONE PEOPLE". But they have no REAL love or brotherhood in mind. They want to -
-betray you
-cheat you
-fool you
-trick you
-burn you through deception
-outwit you
-rob you
-screw you.
So, the first RULE of dealing with Woyane is to say ... SHOW ME we are brothers. Show me you love the Eritrean people.
-Accept the border issue without conditions, without settling people there, without deception.
-Apologize for kicking out 100,000 Eritreans just because you don't like the color of their eyes
-Compensate or return the property you have stolen, etc.
So, the FIRST RULE OF DEALING WITH WOYANE: DO NOT TRUST WHAT THEY SAY. LOOK AT WHAT THEY DO.

2-REVENGE --- Woyane are driven by sense of victimhood. They say the Eritreans hate us, insult us... the Amhara insult us ...so we have to SHOW them we are powerful, that we can hurt them. They do not have the mind set of a WINNER but that of a victim who complains. You hear Woyane complain that is Abiy who is destroying Ethiopia ... what have the done to the Ethiopia in the last 27 years ... what have they done to Eritrea in the last 20 years .... ... Woyane will NEVER forgive you ... until he kills you or destroys you ... so when they say the are sorry for what happened between Eritrea and Tigrai ... it means they were not able to take revenge on Eritreans. So, they will always find a way to weaken Eritrea so they can take revenge on the people of Eritrea. If they are sincere about forgiveness ... they apologize, accept the court verdict SINCERELY and show by ACTION you mean what you say. Words are cheap, especially from the mouth of Woyane!

3-SUSPICION --- Wayne never TRUST anyone. They do not trust the Eritrean people, Amhara, Oromo ... they cannot trust Oromo, Amhara, etc. they will not allow them to run Ethiopia. Because they think they will destroy Tigrai. They do not believe in the law ... but the gun. Because when they were in power, they lived through the power of the gun and not law. So, they think others will not respect the law. There is no law in Wayne land ... only guns, deception, revenge. They know they have hurt a lot of people.... so they do not trust anyone.

Please read the following Harvard research into the MIND of people mentioned here, and see if
1-Deception
2-Revenge
3-Suspicion are the key values to survive in the Horn of Africa.

If we are to develop economically, we have to come out of this mind set of deception, revenge, suspicion and start thinking like real brothers and sisters and build a Region that is based on productivity, trade and law.
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A Content Analysis of Ethiopian Folktales

No attempt was made to distinguish between the stories of individual cultural groups within Ethiopia. The manner in which it was necessary to gather the stories made this impossible. Most of the stories may, however, be assumed to come from the Amhara-Tigre peoples who dominate the political life of Ethiopia. The conclusions drawn from the analysis are probably most pertinent to these two relatively closely related groups.

A content analysis of behavior patterns in 129 Ethiopian folktales to identify rules governing payoffs in the game of everyday living as perceived in the traditional Ethiopian culture is presented. The study concluded that Ethiopians tend to view the life game as zero-sum, non-shared sum, and yielding at best a 1imited payoff. This view results in a set of survival strategies based on self-protection, deception, and revenge aimed either at maintaining the status quo or advancing oneself at the expense of others. Perceived opportunities for initiative and cooperation in service to the community are limited. Personal efficacy is perceived as present in interpersonal exchanges, but not in exchanges with the impersonal environment.

The concepts of game theory appear to provide one of the more promising frameworks for studying relationships between an individual’s broad social experience and behaviours significant to the process of economic and social development.

Indeed the shared perceptions and acceptance among a group of people of the rules, scoring systems, and primary obstacles to be overcome in the life game and the resulting strategies which the individual
living within the culture develops for dealing with his world can account, in large measure, for culturally distinctive patterns of behavior.

Life Game Dimensions

The following dimensions provide a basis for classification of culturally distinctive life game characteristics.

I. Zero-sum vs. variable-sum.

Some cultures will see life as a zero-sum game in which if one player wins,
the other must lose---as in a game of chess or poker. Others will see the game as variable-sum where each player is free to accumulate his own points independent of the success or failure of others---as in golf.

2. Shared-sum vs. non-shared-sum.

The shared-sum game involves alliances or circumstances wherein two or
more players share the same score or fate. The collective defense of the village against outside attack is shared-sum, while two men courting the same girl are usually playing a non-shared sum game.

3. Contingent vs. non-contingent outcomes.

A contingent outcome is dependent on the skill and behavior of the player as in archery. A non-contingent outcome is dependent on events external to the skill or behavior of the player, as in a game of dice, and limits the player’s opportunities for efficacy.

4. Generous vs. limited payoff.

One man tills a fertile field where a little effort will produce a bountiful crop. Another tills a stony, barren field from which heartbreaking toil may produce only a subsistence.

A set of life game perceptions characterized by zero-sum, non-shared sum, non-contingent, and limited payoff conditions should have powerful implications for behavioral strategies. Under such conditions the first concern of the individual must be to survive in an arbitrary, barren world in which the rewards for interpersonal cooperation are few relative to the
rewards for interpersonal treachery.

Leadership positions are not openly sought. Reciprocal obligations are scrupulously honored, but cooperative approaches to village welfare are
seriously limited. Luck rather than achievement is the socially accepted means of advancement. There is little incentive to assuming the risks inherent in innovative behaviors,and preserve the status quo, and
keeping any personal advancement as inconspicuous as possible.

The Folktale as Reflection of Life Game Perceptions

Evidence for the central relationship between Ethiopian folk-literature and social behavior already has been reported by several researchers. Donald Levine (1965b, pp. 1-17) found key aspects of the social behavior of the Ethiopian Amhara reflected in the ambiguity of their poetry. Andrezeiewski (1962) found that themes of stories told among the Ethiopian Borana Galla accurately reflected various of their ideas about warfare. Both Messing (1957) and Levine (l965b, p. 136) have noted that the popularity of Alaqun Gabre- Hanna, a famous hero of Ethiopian
folklore and master of deceit, reflects the Amhara value on living by one’s wits.


RESULTS

Thema Distribution and Outcomes by Major Behavior Category

The Ethiopian story characters were found relatively more often engaged in acquisition, aggression, rejection, retention, and succorance behaviors than were U.S.A. story characters. They were relatively less often engaged in achievement, activity, cognizance, affiliation, recognition, construction,
order, and autonomy behaviors.

The distribution of thema among rewarded, punished and no consequence outcomes on each of the behavior categories was compared for the American and Ethiopian stories using a X2 test. It was found that
the Ethiopian stories attributed significantly more favorable outcomes than American stories to behavior classed as “harmavoidance,” and “aggression.” They attributed significantly less favorable outcomes than
American stories to behaviors classified as “nurturance,” “sentience,” “deference,” “dominance,” and “activity.”


DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The data suggest that the story characters in the Ethiopian folk tales are playing a life game quite different from that of the American story characters.

The Nature of the Game

The emphasis in the Ethiopian stories on acquisition by taking from another, concern for stolen property, greater incidence of retention thema, and lack of construction thema is indicative of a zero-sum life game. There was almost a total absence of thema dealing with the creation of new wealth in the Ethiopian stories—attention being given only to its redistribution among the players. In contrast the U.S. A. stories included a high incidence of achievement, productive effort, and other constructive variable-sum behavior strategies generally recognized as important to the process of economic development.

The non-shared-sum characteristic of the Ethiopian life game was evident the mutual suspicion, the relatively hazardous nature of affiliation and nurturance behaviors, and the repeated demonstration that even close friends can not be trusted. The lesson was stressed that one’s only certain allies are one’s own wits and brawn. The U.S. A. stories generally
portrayed other people as friendly, helpful, and trustworthy—all suggesting a shared-sum game.

The relatively low overall ratio of rewards to punishments in the Ethiopian stories reflects a very meager payoff compared to the very generous payoffs in the U.S. A. stories. The Ethiopian environment was
relatively very unforgiving.

The question of reward contingency turned out to be more complex than anticipated and will be dealt with in a separate section.

The Rules of the Game

The Ethiopian stories lead to the conclusion that adherence to three basic rules is necessary to optimize one’s position in the game.

1. Losses are minimized through continual alertness and suspicion. While laziness was seldom punished, inattention was. Even sleeping, relaxing, and eating could be dangerous if enjoyed to the extent that one was not alert to the possible deceptions or aggressions of another. All interpersonal contacts were potentially dangerous and had to be approached cautiously. Those who approached with offers or requests for assistance or advice very frequently had sinister intentions. Either accepting or extending
hospitality or friendship could be dangerous. Betrayal by a friend was a constant possibility. While such dangers were continually present, those who remained alert and took action to avoid harm could generally
avoid difficulties.

2. Gains are maximized through use of clever interpersonal deceptions. A clever trick or deception was the most frequently successful strategy for
acquisition, escaping from harm, or from the veiled intentions of others, for recovering stolen property, and for avoiding blame for one’s own anti-social acts. The successful deception was usually dependent on
wining another character’s confidence or sympathy trough an act of friendship, assistance, hospitality, or request for assistance. This established a momentary interpersonal commitment which distracted
the other party into “dropping his guard.”

3. Revenge is high payoff strategy, important to retaining respect. Aggression is both frequent and successful in the Ethiopian stories especially as an act revenge. Fifty-eight percent of the Ethiopian
aggression thema involved an after-the-fact response to an actual or assumed wrong and reflected no implication of intended material restitution or immediate self-protection, indicating that revenge was
the primary motive. These thema had the most consistently favorable outcomes of any identifiable category in the Ethiopian stories, suggesting that revenge was an expected and valued behavior. Apart from providing a satisfying emotional release, revenge could be perceived as a useful strategy in a zero-sum game for recapturing lost self-respect and putting
others on notice that one cannot be taken advantage of with impunity. Successful revenge in a sense restores the previous balance between the two parties.

That the rules of the life game in the Ethiopian stories contrasted sharp with those in the American stories is perhaps most clearly reflected in the broad behavioral categories into which it was appropriate to group characters in the two story samples. Child et al. (1946) classified the characters in the U.S.A. stories as either main characters or anti-social
characters. The antisocial character was basically one who engaged in non-shared-sum, zero-sum behavior strategies. By this standard nearly all of the characters in the Ethiopian stories would have been classed as anti-social. In the Ethiopian stories a more useful classification system distinguished between the foolish, the clever, and the wise. The fool was the character who allowed himself to fall victim to the ploys of the clever. The wise man was usually an older man whose wisdom allowed him to avoid the trickster, but who did not attempt to advance himself at the expense of others. While a less frequent character in the stories, the wise man appears to represent the ultimate standard of value in the society.

That the imagery of the Ethiopian stories is generally consistent with actual social behavior in Ethiopia is well supported by a wide variety of
studies documenting the prevalence of interpersonal suspicion, trickery and deception, revenge and limited instances of cooperative behavior (Hoben, 1963; Korten 1968, in press; Levine, 1965a, 1965b, & 1966; Lewis, 1965; Lipskey, 1962; Messing , 1957; Shack 1963, & 1966).

Payoff Contingency and the Sense of Personal Efficacy

A cursory look at the data in Table 2 would suggest that payoffs reflected in the imagery of the Ethiopian stories are to only a very limited degree contingent on the individual’s behavior. While the Murray categories discriminated sharply between those behaviors which were punished and those which were rewarded in the U.S. A. stories, in the Ethiopian stories the results of a given category of behavior were relatively more constant—regardless of the behavior chosen. A deeper look at the stories suggests, however, that the Murray categories, which were developed from a U.S A. perspective, are simply less relevant for organizing the perceptions of the Ethiopian concerning his own life game. Indeed, the data which led to the derivation of the three game rules stated above suggest that when the relevant frame of reference is employed, the outcomes of behavior in the Ethiopian stories are highly contingent on the behavior chosen and reflect a considerable degree of efficacy in contrast to the predicted fatalism.

The nature of this efficacy seems, however, to be significantly influenced by the restrictions inherent in a zero-sum, non-shared-sum life game. The nature of the game forces a focus primarily on redistribution of wealth rather than its creation. Thus, efficacy is only present when playing against other human or animal actors. In relating to his physical or impersonal environment fatalistic behaviors remain appropriate. Nothing in the Ethiopian stories suggests any sense of efficacy in relating to the physical or impersonal environment. Indeed, thema involving interaction with a non-personal environment are quite rare.

This orientation is quite consistent with the conditions of life in a pre-technological society. Modern societies create the conditions of a
variable-sum game through applications of technology to create new wealth from the physical environment. To the individual in the technological society the physical environment is at least as important an
element in the life game as are other players. Thus, we find that the Ethiopian characters played their games primarily with other human actors, while the American characters more often interacted with their
total environment—human and/or physical. Essentially the U.S. A. life game is at least perceived as providing a greater range of strategies associated with contingent outcomes.

These differences in perceived opportunities can lead a Westerner to conclude that the Ethiopians are fatalistic. The data from the present study suggest that the Ethiopian may indeed experience his own efficacy in a much more profound, though quite different way than does the American. Within the range of controllable experience the behavior of the Ethiopian fantasy characters regularly made the difference between life and death—a situation not entirely at odds with the realities of traditional Ethiopian life with its aggressive warrior traditions, banditry, and harsh authoritarian rule. There is little indication that survival was so often at stake in the American stories. While the more liberal and forgiving payoff schedule in the U.S. A. stories may reflect a greater sense of hope and self-confidence, it is unlikely to generate the same sense of urgency.
In using the game rules to one’s own advantage as the somewhat more fundamental outcomes of the Ethiopian stories.

These observations may explain why rewards and punishments are so nearly equal in the Ethiopian stories. Since most behaviors involved a zero-sum interaction between two or more players, a positive outcome for one produced a negative outcome for another, thus keeping overall rewards and punishments roughly balance.

Significance of Omitted Themes

The importance of survival strategies in the Ethiopian imagery is emphasized not only by what is present in the Ethiopian stories, but also by what is omitted. Achievement and construction thema were relatively rare or non-existent and there were few instances of behaviors where the reward was personal and intrinsic to the activity itself. This is reflected in the sparsity of activity thema, sentience thema, such as those involving esthetic appreciation, and in the lack of personal satisfaction resulting
from achievement and acquisition of general knowledge. That such acts of self-realization were relatively unimportant in the Ethiopian stories is consistent with Maslow’s (1954) theory of the need hierarchy. When the primary concern of the 1ife game is survival, all available attention and energy are focused on this goal The higher needs, generally fullfilled through more intrinsic rewards, necessarily assume lesser priority.

Implications

Almost exclusive reliance on survival strategies, rational as it may be for the conditions facing the peasant, creates a major barrier to development of the leadership, initiative, and cooperative effort required for social and economic development. The use of game theory concepts seems useful in identifying the specific changes in experience and perceptual orientation required to replace survival strategies with developmental strategies consistent with the possibilities generated by modern technology. It may
also be helpful in dealing with the problems of fatalism and efficacy in a more precise way.

Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the present study is the fact that the Ethiopian Ministry of Education, through use of traditional folktales as
reading material in the modern schools, is perpetuating, probably unintentionally, the transmission of just those aspects of Ethiopian
tradition which inhibit rather than support the process of modernization to which the Ethiopian government is supposedly committed. The school system which promotes advancement through teaching the skills of modernization, such as reading, is doing only a partial job if it is not also using every opportunity to create a sense of new possibilities and a new set of life game strategies consistent with achieving them.

[Economist]

የእስረኞች አጣብቂኝ (Prisoner’s Dilemma)

በኢኮኖሚስቶች ዓለም የእስረኞች አጣብቂኝ የምትባል ፅንሰ ሀሳብ አለች። የማትገባበት ቦታ የለም። በወልና በተናጠል የሚደረጉ ውሳኔዎች ጥንካሬና ድክመት ለመመዘን እንደመነሻ የምንጠቀምባት ጽንሰሀሳብ ነች።

ለምሳሌ ሰዎች ስንባል ብዙ ጊዜ የመተባበር ችግር እንዳለብን ይታወቃል። ለምን? የሚለውን ጥያቄ በዘዴ ለማወቅ ይህ ፅንስ ሀሳብ ይረዳል። ላለመተባበር ምክንያቱ ከታወቀ ምንጩ ምን ሊሆን ይችላል ለሚለው ጥያቄ ፍንጭ ይሰጣል። ብዙ ግዜ መነሻ ምክንያቶቹ ሊሆኑ የሚችሉት የመረጃ ልዩነት (information asymmetry)፣ ውሳኔው የሚያስከትለው ኪሳራ ወይም ጥቅም（incentive/payoff structure）፣ ከቀድሞ ውሳኔዎች የመማር እድል፣ የተሳታፊዎች ብዛት ወዘተ ናቸው። ከነዚህ መካከል መነሻ ምክንያቱ የትኛው እንደሆነ ሲታወቅ ቀጣይ ውሳኔ ትብብር ላይ የተመሰረተና የብዙሀኑን ጥቅም የሚያስጠብቅ እንዲሆን የተለያዩ የማስተካከያ እርምጃዎችን ለመውሰድ ይረዳል።

ዝነኛ በሆነችው ምሳሌ ጉዟችንን እንጀምር።

ሁለት ግለሰቦች በአንድ ወንጀል ተጠርጥረው ህግ ፊት ቀርበዋል። ሁለቱም ለየብቻ ታስረው በተናጠል ምርመራ እየተደረገላቸው ነው። ለእያንዳንዳቸው የሚከተሉት 3 አማራጮች ቀረቡላቸው፣

1 አንተ ካመንክና ተባባሪህ ካላመነ 1 ዓመት ብቻ ትቀጣለህ።

2 አንተ ካላመንክና ተባባሪህ ካመነ 10 ዓመት ትቀጣለህ (እርሱ 1 ዓመት ብቻ ይቀጣል ማለት ነው)።

3 ሁለታችሁም ካመናችሁ ስላመናችሁ 1 ዓመት ተቀንሶላችሁ 5 ዓመት ብቻ ትቀጣላችሁ።

（4 ሁለቱም ካላመኑ ፖሊስ በራሱ መንገድ ማስረጃ ይፈልጋል። ማረጋገጥ ከቻለ 6 ዓመት ይቀጣቸዋል። ካልቻለ በ48 ሰዓት ውስጥ ይለቃቸውና የማጣራት ስራውን ይሰራል። ምንም ማስረጃ ከሌለው ነጻ ይሆናሉ።）

ምርጫውን ላንተ ትቸዋለሁ ብሎ ውልቅ ይላል። ትንሽ ጊዜ ለመስጠት ያህል። ተመልሶ ሲመጣ ይጠይቃል። ብልጦች ከሆኑ የሚያዋጣቸው አለማመን ነው። ነገር ግን አብዛኛውን ግዜ አእምሯችን እንደዛ አይሰራም።

ተጠርጣሪው አመነ።

ምክንያቱም ጓደኛው ካመነና እርሱ ካላመነ፣ ጓደኛው በ1 ዓመት ሲገላገል፣ እርሱ 10 ዓመት ሊልፍ ሆነ። ሁለቱም ካመኑ እያንዳቸው የሚጠብቃቸው 5 ዓመት ነው። ይሻላል። እርሱ አምኖ ጓደኛው ካላመነ ደግሞ ጸሃይ ወጣለት ማለት ነው። በ1 ዓመት እስራት ይገላገላል፣ ጓደኛው ደግሞ 10 ዓመት ይልፋል። ስለዚህ ካለማመን ማመን ይሻላል። ለምኔ？ ብሎ ጓደኛውን አሳልፎ ለመስጠት ወስኗል።

ክፋቱ ያኛውም በተመሳሳይ መንገድ፣ ተመሳሳይ አመክንዮ በማቅረብ አምኗል። ስለዚህ ሁለቱም 5 ዓመታቸውን ጠጡ። ሁለቱም እንደተማማሉት ክደው ጭጭ ቢሉ ፖሊስ ማስረጃ እስኪያሰባስብ ነጻ ይለቃቸው ነበር። ማስረጃ ፍለጋ ይዳክራል፤ እስኪያገኝ ድረስ ነጻ ናቸው። በግዜ ገደቡ ማስረጃ ካላቀረበ ደግሞ ክሱ ውድቅ ሆኖ ነጻ ይሆናሉ። ከማመን ይልቅ ባለማመን የመታሰር እድላቸው ዝቅተኛ ይሆን ነበር። ነገር ግን ፖሊሱ ስስ ብልታቸውን ያውቃልና (ኢኮኖሚክስ ተምሯልና ) በዘዴ ጠልፎ መረቡ ላይ ጣላቸው። ለ5 ዓመት አሰራቸው።

ይህ ችግር በኢኮኖሚክስ ቋንቋ coordination problem ይባላል። ምንጩ የመረጃ እጥረት ነው። በህልውና ጥያቄ ላይ አንደኛው የሚያስበውን ሌላኛው ሊያውቅ አይችልም። እንደ ቁማር አስልቶ ይገምታል ብቻ። እኔ ብሆን በሱ ቦታ ምን አደርግ ነበር እያለ በተዘዋዋሪ የራሱን ባህሪ ያጠናል። ከዛ ውጪ ሌላ አማራጭ የለውምና፡ በተለይ ደግሞ ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ ከሆነ የተያዙት። በተደጋጋሚ የተያዙ ከሆነ፣ ከቀድሞ ስህተታቸው ተምረው፣ መተማመንን ያዳብራሉ። ይተባበራሉ። በጋራ መካድ እንደሚያዋጣቸው ያውቃሉ። የcoordination problemን ለመፍታት አንዱ ቁልፍ መንገድ ከቀድሞ ስህተት መማር ነው።

ከመነሻው የግል ጥቅምን ከማሳደድ ይልቅ ትብብር ላይ የተመሰረተ የኑሮ ዘይቤ መከተል የሚቀናን ከሆነ ይህ ችግር አያጋጥመንም። እያንዳንዳቸው ሰለፊሽ በሆነችው መንገድ አስልተው ባያምኑና ጭጭ ቢሉ ኖሮ 5 ዓምት ባልጠጡ ነበር። ቢያንስ ማስረጃ እስኪገኝ ድረስ ነጻ ናቸው። ሙሉ በሙሉ ነጻ የመሆን እድላቸውም ከፍተኛ ነው። ከምንም በላይ ደግሞ በክህደት ራሳቸውን አያስገምቱም ነበር። ጸጸቱ ቀላል ነው እንዴ？ ነገር ግን በተናጠል ያሰሉት የግል ጥቅምን ማስፋት ነው። ወደ 1 ዝቅ ለማለትና አስሯን ለማስቀረት። አስሯን ከራሱ ለማስቀረት ሲያሰላ በተዘዋዋሪ ጓደኛው ላይ ለመወርወር ወስኗል። አሳልፎ መስጠትና አለመተማመን፣ ተንጋሎ እንደመትፋት ነው። ተመልሶ ለራስ ይተርፋል።

ይህ የመተባበር ችግር በተለይ በኛ በኢትዮጵያውያን በሁሉም መስክ ዘውትር ይታያል። ፖለቲካችን በመተማመን ወደፊት መገስገስ ሳይሆን በመጠላለፍ መንገዳገድ ይቀናዋል። ማህበራዊ ህይወታችን መተማመን ላይ የተመሰረተ አይደለም። እንዳውም ለትብብር ቅርብና ቀና የሆኑ ሰዎችን እንደ ጅል ማየት ይቀናናል። የምናደንቀው ብልጦችን ነው። የራሳቸውን የማያስነኩ የሌላውን መመንተፍ የተካኑ። ይህ በተለይ በከተሞች አካባቢ ይብሳል። ከተሜነት ጩልሌነት ነው እንዴ ያስብላል። በጋራ የምንጠቀምባቸው ነገሮችን ማየት ይቻላል። መንገድ ላይ እንጸዳዳለን። ያልተከልነው ደን እንመነጥራለን። የህዝብ ካዝና እናራቁታለን። የመንግስት መኪና ስንጠቀም ነዳጅ እንደውሃ ይረክስብናል። …

በአንድ ወቅት በደንብ ያጠናን አሜሪካዊ የደረሰበትን ድምዳሜ በማካፈል ለዛሬ ያዘጋጀሁትን አጭር ጽሁፍ ልቋጭ።ሊያስቆጣን ቢችልም በውስጡ የማንክደው ሀቅ ስለያዘ በቀናነት እንየው፥

“Ethiopians tend to view the life game as zero-sum, non-shared sum, and yielding at best a limited payoff. This view results in a set of survival strategies based on self-protection, deception, and revenge aimed either at maintaining the status quo or advancing oneself at the expense of others. Perceived opportunities for initiative and cooperation in service to the community are limited. Personal efficacy is perceived as present in interpersonal exchanges, but not in exchanges with the impersonal environment.” (David Korten 1971. The Life Game: Survival Strategies in Ethiopian Folktales.)

የዴቪድ ኮርተን ድምዳሜ የተጋነነ ነው የሚል አይጠፋም። እኔም የምጋራው ነው። ነገር ግን ፖለቲካዊና አብዛኛውን ማህበራዊ ህይወታችን በተለይ ከተማ አካባቢ ያለውን ማህበራዊ ህይወት የሚገልጽ ነገር እንዳለው መካድ አይቻልም። በገጠሩ አካባቢ ያሉ በትብብር ላይ የተመሰረቱ ማህበረ-ኢኮኖሚያዊ ትስስሮች የሚያስተምሩን ነገር ስላለ በሌላ ግዜ እመለስባቸዋለሁ። እስከዛ በሰላም ቆዩኝ！

[Abdelaziz]

CAMPOPOLLO ANDIRTY FESA'FASIL,
READ THAT CRAP SCRIBBLED BY A FICTIONAL FA'GUT WHITE LUMPEM WHO FO'CKS YOU TO YOUR ROTTEN HAMASENAY GRANNY IN HER GRAVE AS THE DEVIL SO'DOMIZES HER SKELETON

[Temt]

Economist, you got to the heart of the evil Weyanes, a twisted heart indeed.